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At a term of the Civil Court of the
State of New York, County of New
York at 111 Centre Street, Part U
New York, NY on July 23, 2020
PRESENT:
HON. J. MACHELLE SWEETING, J.C.C.
Presiding Justice
Harlem Community Justice Center
In a Matter of the Housing Part
-------------------------------------------------------X
A.A.,
Petitioner-Landlord,
-against-

Index No. LT-250574-19
DECISION AND ORDER ON
PETITIONER’S ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE SEEKING TO
RENEW

J.O.,
Respondent-Tenant.
-------------------------------------------------------X

Pursuant to CPLR §2219 (a), the papers considered by this court in deciding this motion to
renew the Decision/Order dated August 6, 2016 (James, J.) denying Petitioner’s motion for
summary judgment are listed below:
Numbered Papers
(1) “Order to Show Cause,” including the “Affirmation in Support” and Attached
Exhibit(s)
(2) “Affidavit in Support of Respondent’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion” and
“Affirmation in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion.”
(3) “Reply Affirmation” and Attached Exhibit(s)
***
Petitioner-landlord (“Petitioner”) seeks to renew the Decision and Order issued on August
6, 2019 by Presiding Justice Ta-Tanisha James, that denied Petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment. The crux of Petitioner’s argument is that a subsequent decision issued by New York
State Supreme Court Justice Lori Sattler on January 17, 2020, declaring that the parties were never
married, offers new facts that are dispositive with respect to all of the factual issues in this case.
Respondent-tenant (“Respondent”) opposes.
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RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 15, 2019, Petitioner filed a holdover petition alleging that Respondent was a
licensee who had been properly served a Notice to Quit, but had failed to vacate the premises.
Subsequently, on May 31, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion seeking summary judgment. Respondent
opposed, inter alia, on the grounds that he was more than a mere licensee, because the parties were
married, thus entitling him to continued occupancy of the premises. Respondent also argued that
there was a matrimonial action pending before the Supreme Court (Justice Sattler) and that the
housing court proceedings should be stayed until a determination on the validity of the marriage
had been made by the Supreme Court. The issue was fully briefed and heard before Judge James.
On August 6, 2019, Judge James issued a Decision and Order denying the summary
judgment motion. It read, in part:
Respondent alleges that he and Petitioner are married pursuant to New York
law, and as such, he is not a mere licensee that can be removed from the
subject premises through summary proceedings. Respondent asserts that he
commenced divorce proceedings in Supreme Court and that any issues
pertaining to his continued occupancy in the apartment must be determined
in that forum.
In a written decision issued on January17, 2020, Justice Sattler unequivocally found that
there was no valid marriage between the parties, and ordered Respondent to pay $1,000 in counsel
fees to Petitioner.
On February 12, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant motion, pursuant to CPLR §2221(e),
seeking to renew his motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CPLR §2221(e) states that a motion for leave to renew shall “be based on new facts not
offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination” or shall demonstrate that
there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination, and shall contain
reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion [emphasis added].
First, it is undisputed that the Supreme Court issued a decision that unequivocally held that
the parties had no valid marriage. This meets the standard set forth in CPLR §2221(e) of “new
facts not offered on the prior motion.”
Further, Respondent himself concedes that the decision of the Supreme Court decides this
issue regarding whether or not a marriage exists, and that he is collaterally estopped from claiming
that he is Petitioner’s legally married spouse. Hence, Petitioner’s motion to renew is granted for
Page 2 of 5

the sole and limited purpose of the parties appropriately stipulating that this issue is no longer in
dispute.
However, these new facts do not resolve Respondent’s remaining claims, namely that even
if he is not a spouse, he is a family member.
Section 713(7) of the RPAPL provides, in pertinent part, that a summary proceeding may
be brought to recover possession of real property after notice has been made if the respondent “is
a licensee of the person entitled to possession of the property at the time of the license, and [a] the
license has expired, or [b] the license has been revoked, or [c] the licensor is no longer entitled to
possession of the property.”
It is also well-established that a licensee is “one who enters upon or occupies lands by
permission, express or implied, of the owner, or under a personal, revocable, nonassignable
privilege from the owner, without possessing any interest in the property, and who becomes a
trespasser thereon upon revocation of the permission of the privilege” (Robinson v. Holder, 24
Misc. 3d 1232(A) (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 2009).
Here, Petitioner’s argument that if not a spouse, Respondent must necessarily be a licensee,
ignores the existence of the remaining issues of fact, namely, whether Respondent, though not a
spouse, may nevertheless be a “family member” (see e.g. Minors v. Tyler, 137 Misc.2d 505
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1987) (affording rights beyond that of licensee to family members in holdover
proceedings and creating a family member exception such that paramour or partners may not be
evicted even if the parties were not legally married, but there was evidence of a “marital
relationship”); Dejesus v. Rodriguez, 196 Misc. 2d 881 (Civ. Ct. Richmond Cnty. 2003) (holding
that ex-girlfriend was not mere licensee whose license had been revoked upon termination of
parties’ relationship, and thus owner could not employ summary proceedings to remove her from
property); Xinyang Yu v. Shuwen Zhan, 62 Misc. 3d 1202(A) (N.Y. Dist. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2018)
(finding “Generally, and with limited exceptions, a family member may not evict another family
member in a summary proceeding where the occupancy arises out of a familial relationship […]
In interpreting the definition of a ‘family,’ courts have traditionally considered whether the parties
lived together ‘in a family unit’ with ‘some indicia of permanence or continuity’ […] Whether the
parties resided together has often been the ‘critical factor’ in determining whether they are to be
considered a ‘family’ for legal purposes”).
In the underlying decision, Judge James held:
Even in situations where the parties were not legally married as evidenced by a valid
marriage certificate, courts have found a family member relationship (see Braschi v. Stahl
Assoc. Co., 74 NY2d 201 [1989] […]). The Braschi Court held that a gay lifetime partner
was a family member eligible to succeed to an apartment after the death of his partner who
was the lawful tenant. Petitioner argues that Respondent incorrectly relies on the holding
in Braschi, as the apartment at issue there was an apartment subject to rent regulation,
whereas here, Petitioner is a shareholder of the subject premises and the apartment is not
subject to rent regulation. The Court is not persuaded by that argument. While there are
differences in the facts of the cases and the regulatory status of the apartments at issue, the
holding in Braschi and the definition of “family” set forth in the decision has been applied
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in other cases similar to this one in which unmarried couples lived together long term in
premises that were not always subject to rent regulation […].
Accordingly, the Court finds that on this record Petitioner has not shown entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law, as triable issues of fact exist as to the nature of the
relationship between the parties and as to Respondent's alleged status as a licensee.
Additionally, given that the parties do not have a legalized marriage, there is question as to
whether or not the action filed by Respondent in Supreme Court will move forward.
Similarly, the Court cannot dismiss the underlying proceeding in its entirety, as the
two pictures, proof of one credit account where Petitioner made Respondent an
authorized user and copy of Petitioner's passport application where Respondent is
referred to by Petitioner as his “partner,” attached to Respondent's motion are
insufficient for the Court to find that Respondent and Petitioner lived as a married
couple, making Respondent more than a mere licensee (emphasis added).

In her decision, Judge James did not find the issue of whether a marriage existed to be
dispositive. Rather, she explicitly held out the possibility that Respondent could, nevertheless,
based on the alleged facts of the case, be Petitioner’s “family member,” under the standard set
forth in Braschi, regardless of whether the parties were married. Notably, Judge James concluded
that regardless of whether the parties were married, the court could not dismiss the underlying
proceeding in its entirety or determine, based on the pictures and other alleged documentary
evidence, whether the Respondent was more than a mere licensee.
Importantly, in Braschi, the Court of Appeals stated:
[…] we conclude that the term family, as used in 9 NYCRR 2204.6 (d), should not be
rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for
instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended protection against
sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead
should find its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more
realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners
whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence. This view comports both with our society's traditional
concept of ”family“ and with the expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear units
[…] Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that, in using the term ”family,“ the Legislature
intended to extend protection to those who reside in households having all of the normal
familial characteristics. Appellant Braschi should therefore be afforded the opportunity to
prove that he and Blanchard had such a household.
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Because there remain triable issues of fact as to the nature of the relationship between the
parties and Respondent’s alleged status as a family member or mere licensee, Petitioner’s motion
for summary judgment and to renew on this ground is denied.
This is the Decision and Order of the court.

Dated: July 23, 2020
New York, NY

______________________________
Hon. J. Machelle Sweeting
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